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The Strategic Role of Reinsurance in the United Kingdom’s (UK) 
Non-Life Insurance Market 
 
Abstract 
Using panel data for five main lines of insurance in the United Kingdom’s 
(UK) non-life insurance market we demonstrate that by increasing the 
level of reinsurance, primary insurers increase their product-market share 
at the expense of less reinsured rivals. We also observe that the influence 
of reinsurance and other financial variables on insurers’ growth in 
product-market share differs across lines of insurance business. We 
conclude that reinsurance performs an important strategic function in 
insurance markets through its impact on product-market outcomes in 
competitive insurance markets. Additionally, we find that leverage is the 
most important factor affecting product-market share at the aggregate 
business level of the insurance firm.  
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I. Introduction  
Recent studies reported in the finance literature demonstrate that 
corporate hedging decisions affect the strategic performance of firms and 
as a result, product-market considerations are an integral part of the 
corporate risk management process (e.g. Harris and Raviv, 1991; Froot, 
Scharfstein and Stein, 1993; Adam, Dasgupta and Titman, 2007). In the 
spirit of this stream of research, the present study examines the strategic 
role of reinsurance in influencing annual changes in product-market share 
in five main segments of the United Kingdom’s (UK) non-life (property-
liability) insurance market – motor vehicle, property, legal liability, 
personal accident, and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss.  
Reinsurance is a conditional financial claims contract written by a 
third party (the reinsurer) that indemnifies the counterparty (the primary 
insurer) for random loss events in return for a share of annual premiums 
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written (Doherty and Tinic, 1981)1. Doherty and Tinic (1981) report that 
reinsurance enables primary insurers to more effectively manage cash 
flow volatility, maintain future underwriting capacity, and reduce the 
probability of ruin. The strategic finance function of reinsurance is 
important not only because solvency risk matters to policyholders and 
insurance industry regulators, but also because of market imperfections 
(e.g., frictional costs and taxes) retaining capital can be costly for funding 
providers (Harrington and Niehaus, 2003). Froot and O’Connell (2008) 
also contend that managers of insurance firms are particularly likely to 
reinsure non-standardized and difficult-to-assess risk exposures (that 
often typify lines of non-life insurance such as legal liability). This risk-
transfer/risk-sharing capability enables primary insurers to economize on 
the costs of financing positive NPV investments, protect cash holdings, 
reduce premiums (prices), and increase their market power. Jean-
Baptiste and Santomero (2000) further observe that reinsurers possess 
proprietary advantages (e.g., superior information on emergent risks) 
that primary insurers can share (at cost) in order to more accurately price 
assumed risks and thereby secure competitive advantages over rivals. 
Fresard (2010) argues that when external finance is costly, capital 
and liquidity management decisions can play important roles in 
influencing competitive outcomes for firms. Zou and Adams (2008) add 
that risk management decisions (such as (re)insurance) can be influenced 
by size-related factors such as the ability of firms to efficiently diversify 
and retain risks. The present study thus examines the extent to which 
reinsurance (as a common indemnity risk management contract in 
insurance markets) influences the product-market position of insurance 
firms while simultaneously controlling for other potentially important 
intervening firm-specific factors such as leverage, liquidity, and size. Our 
                                                 
1 Winton (1995) points out that there are two main risk-sharing treaties between a reinsurer and 
insurer: proportional (e.g., quota share) treaties where losses are shared between the parties on 
an agreed percentage basis; and non-proportional (e.g., excess-of-loss) treaties where the 
reinsurance company absorbs all losses over an amount that is retained by the insurer subject to 
an upper limit. Adiel (1996) also notes that in insurance markets, reinsurance can also include 
financial (or finite) reinsurance that commonly provide an up-front capital injection or relief to 
reserves (surplus) linked to the net present value (NPV) of liabilities with the level of ceded 
premiums linked to the value of future claims and profit emergence. However, data on different 
risk-sharing reinsurance treaties and financial reinsurance arrangements were not publicly 
available for the full period of our analysis (1987-2010). 
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research is motivated in four key regards. First, insurance product-
markets are becoming more price competitive in developed economies 
such as the United States (US) and UK, particularly in the wake of the 
recent global economic crisis (Doherty and Lamm-Tennant, 2009; A. M. 
Best, 2012). This has heightened the importance for empirical research 
on how reinsurance can be used to secure strategic competitive 
advantages - for example, by allowing insurers to reduce prices but at the 
same time maintain solvency and sufficient holdings of cash (liquidity) for 
investing in positive NPV projects. Second, indemnity contracts, such as 
reinsurance, are pure hedge instruments that cannot be used for 
speculation (Doherty, 2000; Aunon-Nerin and Ehling, 2008). This means 
that by acting as a pure hedge against claims volatility, reinsurance 
enables primary insurers to more effectively plan and price new products 
and to ensure sufficient risk capacity for such new lines of business. 
Therefore, risk financing impacts on primary insurers’ marketing 
strategies and the micro-structure of insurance markets, which in turn 
directly influences the product-market share of insurance firms. Such 
perspectives are likely to be of commercial, regulatory and policy interest. 
Third, our single country/single industry focus 'naturally’ controls for 
biases (e.g., due to differences in risk management practices and 
product-market structure) that can arise in cross-industry and/or 
transnational research. At the same time, the results of the present study 
could be generalized to other industrial sectors (e.g., banking) that also 
use hedging tools to grow their business and maximize the value of the 
firm. Fourth, our study provides insights on the product-market linkages 
between reinsurance, and capital and liquidity management decisions in 
insurance firms. For example, Zanjani (2002) argues that the ability of 
insurers to differentiate product prices, and so influence their competitive 
position in markets, can be related to their marginal costs of capital, 
liquidity position, and ability to transfer assumed (extreme) risks through 
the purchase of reinsurance. However, this strategic dimension of 
reinsurance has neither been given sufficient emphasis nor fully 
investigated in previous empirical studies of insurance markets. In this 
respect, our research adds to the extant literature on the impact of 
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capital, liquidity and risk management on the product-market position of 
firms and the shaping of market structure.  
In summary, our results indicate that increasing the level of 
reinsurance allows primary insurers to grow their product-market share at 
the expense of less reinsured rivals. We also observe that the influence of 
reinsurance and other financial variables on insurers’ growth in product-
market share varies between lines of insurance business. Additionally, 
financial leverage is an important factor affecting product-market share at 
the aggregate business level of the insurance firm. 
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows. Section II 
provides institutional background information on the UK’s non-life 
insurance market. In Section III we review the relevant strategic finance 
literature and develop our primary research hypothesis. Section IV 
describes our research design, including an outline of the modelling 
procedure employed, definition of the variables used, and a description of 
the data. Section V analyses and discusses the empirical results. Finally, 
Section VI concludes the paper. 
II. Institutional Background 
The UK’s non-life insurance market comprises about 360 or so locally 
licensed and active domestically-owned and foreign-owned companies, 
subsidiaries and branches of varying size, ownership structure, and 
product-mix2. The market currently generates approximately £47 billion 
(US$76 billion) in net (of reinsurance) annual premiums (Association of 
British Insurers, 2011) 3 . In addition, 87 Lloyd’s syndicates currently 
underwrite non-life premiums of roughly £24 billion (US$39 billion) mainly 
in marine, aviation and transport (MAT) lines of insurance (A.M. Best, 
                                                 
2 Additionally, 548 non-life insurers licensed by European Economic Area (EEA) member states are 
permitted to conduct business in the UK under the 1992 Third European Insurance Directive 
(Financial Services Authority, 2013). However, these non-life insurance firms are not regulated by 
the UK insurance industry regulator and so they are outside the scope of this study.  
 
3  Approximately 150 or so inactive (and mainly small) non-life insurance funds were also 
authorized to operate in the UK as at the end of 2010. Furthermore, about 600 EU-based 
insurance carriers are currently permitted to transact insurance business in the UK under various 
promulgations of the EU’s Third Non-Life Insurance Directive. In addition, the relative proportion of 
total annual premiums currently written (plus the approximate number of firms) in the five main 
lines of business examined in the present study are: motor vehicle – 37% (n~50); property – 30% 
(n~70); legal liability – 11%; (n~60); personal accident – 14% (n~45); and miscellaneous and 
pecuniary loss – 8% (n~60)(Association of British Insurers, 2011). 
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2012). By this standard, the UK is the largest insurance market in Europe 
and the third largest in the world after the US and Japan (Shiu, 2011). 
The annual value of non-life reinsurance premiums in the UK (including 
Lloyd’s) is about £23 billion (US$37billion) with approximately 70% of 
annual market reinsurance premiums transacted with global reinsurance 
corporations such as Munich Re and Swiss Re (Data Monitor, 2011). The 
UK’s non-life insurance and reinsurance markets are relatively 
unregulated with regard to the quantum of losses that can be covered, 
indemnity terms, type of contract permitted, and so on (Shiu, 2011). In 
many ways, reinsurers operating in the UK are regulated on much the 
same basis as primary insurers (Abdul Kader, Adams and Mouratidis, 
2010). For example, insurance and reinsurance companies operating in 
the UK have to be approved and licensed by the insurance industry 
regulator 4 . The regulator is, amongst other things, responsible for 
monitoring and reviewing the capital adequacy (including reinsurance 
arrangements) of insurance and reinsurance companies doing business in 
the UK. Since 2007, UK-based reinsurers are also subject to the European 
Union’s (EU’s) Reinsurance Directive which aims, amongst other things, to 
ensure consistency in reinsurers’ reserving practices, standards of capital 
maintenance, and solvency reporting (Abdul Kader et al., 2010). 
The UK’s non-life reinsurance market is a potentially interesting 
environment within which to conduct this research project for three main 
reasons. First, as in other developed insurance markets such as the US, 
reinsurance is becoming an increasingly important capital and risk 
management device in the UK as a greater range of potentially high value 
and difficult to predict risk exposures emerge (Froot, 2001). Reinsurance 
is also likely to become a particularly salient strategic issue for UK 
insurers following the implementation of the European Union’s (EU) new 
risk capital (Solvency II) requirements on 1 January 2016 (Abdul Kader et 
                                                 
 
4 During the period of our analysis (1987- 2010) UK insurance companies were regulated first by 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and from 2001 by the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA). From 1 April 2013, the statutory supervision and regulation of UK insurance companies has 
been conducted by the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) while insurance market practices and 
consumer issues have been regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). Both regulatory 
bodies are subsidiaries of the Bank of England. 
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al., 2010). Second, property-casualty lines of insurance in the UK tend to 
be supplied by a small number of composite insurers (e.g., Aviva and 
Royal Sun Alliance) (A.M. Best, 2011). However, EU-induced deregulation 
since the 1990s, business opportunities at the Lloyd's of London insurance 
market, and extensive and varied distribution networks have increased 
price and product-market competition in the domestic market, particularly 
in personal lines and motor insurance. These developments have 
combined to make the UK the most competitive insurance market in the 
EU (Hardwick and Dou, 2006). Thus our study provides evidence on the 
strategic dimension of the reinsurance–market share relation in 
competitive insurance environments. Third, unlike in the US where many 
State-based insurance regulators impose higher capital maintenance 
requirements on foreign (so-called ‘alien’) reinsurance companies than 
US-owned reinsurers (Weiss and Chung, 2004); UK regulations do not 
discriminate between reinsurance companies according to their domicile 
of origin. Again unlike the US, the UK is also a unitary fiscal environment 
and does not impose regulatory limits on premiums as do some states in 
the US (e.g., New York). These institutional differences are important as 
reinsurance, taxes, and premium rates directly influence underwriting 
capacity and product-market strategies. Therefore, compared with the 
US, the purchase of reinsurance and product-market decisions of UK 
insurers is less likely to be affected by regulation-induced market 
disequilibria such as constrained supply and price distortions. These 
institutional features thus enable us to conduct a potentially more robust 
test of the linkage between reinsurance and the strategic objectives of 
primary insurers, and so build on the extant literature. 
 
III. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
In this section we review the relevant theoretical and empirical 
literature linking the financial and risk management of firms with their 
competitive position in the product-markets that they operate. We then 
put forward the main research hypothesis that directs our empirical tests. 
Towards a Strategic Theory of Reinsurance 
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The trading of insurance risks in secondary reinsurance markets 
enables the managers of insurance firms to realize important strategic 
objectives such as meeting statutory minimum levels of solvency, 
increasing underwriting capacity, and increasing firm value (e.g., by 
reducing future taxes and agency costs) (Mayers and Smith, 1990). These 
financial and risk management attributes of reinsurance can have a direct 
impact on the product-market share of insurance firms – for example, by 
helping them provide enhanced surety to policyholders, brokers and 
regulators and so attract more new business and increase product-market 
share (Doherty and Tinic, 1981). The product-market position of primary 
insurers can be further enhanced by reinsurers as a result of their 
provision for ancillary business advice and the effective monitoring of 
reinsurance arrangements. These attributes can help insurers to increase 
outputs, reduce prices and so grow product-market share and increase 
their market value. These aspects of the strategic marketing function of 
reinsurance in insurance markets and their link with other financial 
management aspects of corporate strategy are examined further below. 
Market Imperfections and Strategic Behavior 
Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) demonstrate that in the presence 
of agency costs and information asymmetries, capital structure and 
associated risk hedging decisions have a favorable effect on the cost of 
borrowing and investment restrictions. This enables them to make 
competitive gains at the expense of rivals by reducing costs (e.g., lower 
debt expenses) and/or increasing revenues (e.g., from new positive NPV 
projects).  
Brander and Lewis (1986), Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), and Opler 
and Titman (1994), amongst others, note that in competitive 
environments, such as the UK’s insurance market5, highly levered firms 
are frequently at risk of predation from lowly levered firms as the former 
are often more cash constrained than the latter6. This situation limits the 
                                                 
5
 Global insurance markets are generally recognized as being competitive in terms of the range 
and type of insurance products available to buyers. As noted earlier in section II, the London 
insurance market (of which Lloyd’s of London is an important part) is particularly noted for its 
innovative and competitive nature (A.M. Best, 2012). 
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ability of cash constrained firms to optimize their investment opportunity 
sets and compete effectively in product-markets. In other words, 
predation risk arises when financially superior (low levered and/or cash 
unconstrained) firms operating in competitive markets influence the 
product-market (e.g., pricing and entry/exit) and investment decisions of 
rivals (Adam, 2009) 7 . Brander and Lewis (1986) argue that because 
shareholders only hold residual claims to free cash flows, efforts to 
maximize firm value are particularly sensitive to the debt-to-equity ratio. 
Therefore, to compete successfully with rivals the managers of highly 
levered firms will seek to reduce debt levels, and the associated agency 
costs of debt, and so improve their competitive product-market positions 
using risk transfer techniques such as reinsurance. However, Campello 
(2006) argues that increased leverage can actually improve the 
competitive positions of firms in product-markets. This is because under 
Jensen’s (1986) ‘free cash flow’ hypothesis, the repayment obligations 
contained in debt covenants reduces agency costs without the need for 
firms to make big investments in risk management, and motivates them 
to generate free cash flows by increasing product-market share through 
investment in productive assets. Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) highlight 
that in competitive product-markets predation risk arises from market 
failure (e.g., agency problems and imperfect information). They further 
argue that costly contracting solutions (such as reinsurance) that are 
designed to mitigate information asymmetries between highly indebted 
firms and their creditors can exacerbate liquidity constraints and so 
stimulate predatory behavior by more lowly levered and cash-rich firms.  
                                                                                                                                                        
6
 Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) define predation risk as the risk that cash-rich firms drive their 
financially constrained competitors out of business by reducing their rivals' free cash flows – e.g., 
by under-cutting market prices. 
 
7 Reinsurance purchases by incumbent non-life insurance firms can also influence the strategic 
decisions and growth opportunities of rivals (e.g., new entrants) that may not have the same 
access to levels of reinsurance coverage and/or reinsurance prices (e.g., due to adverse selection 
issues). Such financial advantages of reinsurance partnerships confer competitive advantages on 
established non-life insurers unless rivals can also secure risk transfer/risk-sharing arrangements 
with reinsurers. Data limitations precluded empirical tests on this aspect to be carried out here. 
However, casual observation suggests that reinsurance is critical to the successful entry and 
survival in insurance markets. For example, Admiral plc entered the UK motor insurance market in 
1992/3 with substantial reinsurance backing from Munich Re (i.e., with 75% of gross annual 
premiums written being reinsured). Admiral plc is now one of the UK’s leading motor insurer with 
roughly 15% of market share in terms of annual written premiums. 
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Myers and Majluf, (1984) posit that a firm’s performance in 
competitive product-markets depends on its ability to realize growth 
opportunities and increase size. However, protecting liquidity levels and 
raising external debt and equity finance can concomitantly increase 
agency costs such as those arising from the underinvestment and asset 
substitution incentives and managerial entrenchment (Myers, 1977). Zou 
and Adams (2008) show that indemnity contracts (in their case, property 
insurance) can lower agency and frictional market costs of capital thereby 
reducing the risks (costs) of financial distress and/or bankruptcy for firms. 
Mayers and Smith (1990) also argue that reinsurance reduces agency and 
other costs of contracting that can arise in highly levered primary insurers 
in post-loss states when external financing costs tend to be high. 
Therefore, reinsurance is expected to be strategically important to cash 
constrained insurance firms as it not only helps them reduce the costs of 
external finance in imperfect markets but also increases their capacity to 
grow new business premiums by increasing underwriting capacity and/or 
diversifying assumed risks. In turn, this capability enables primary 
insurers to invest in positive NPV projects and compete effectively with 
market rivals.  
Rochet and Villenueve (2011) demonstrate that when liquidity and 
(re)insurance decisions are simultaneously determined, cash-rich firms 
are likely to improve their financial performance to a greater degree 
relative to cash-poor firms. Rochet and Villenueve (2011) contend that in 
the face of financing imperfections and high risk volatility in product-
markets, (re)insurance allows firms to build-up cash reserves, stabilize 
investment spending, and lower market costs of capital. However, Gamba 
and Triantis (2008) show that the level of a firm’s cash holdings and 
leverage position are not equivalent when future cash flow streams are 
uncertain, which can be the case following a severe but under-(re)insured 
loss event. Therefore, different combinations of cash, debt, and 
reinsurance could have different effects on firms’ strategic competitive 
product-market positions (e.g., see Fresard, 2010). 
Research Hypothesis  
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The key research question that emerges from the above literature 
review is: What is the product-market outcome of the purchase of 
reinsurance after controlling for insurers’ leverage, cash position, and 
size? We consider this issue to be an empirical question of some 
importance. For example, low leverage without reinsurance could be 
viewed by investors, regulators, and others not as a ‘positive signal’ (e.g., 
indicating an insurer has low insolvency risk) but rather as a ‘negative 
signal’ (e.g., indicating that an insurer has limited capability to generate 
future new business at an affordable cost of capital). Doherty, Lamm-
Tennant and Starks (2003) emphasize the solvency management role of 
reinsurance in enabling insurance firms to retain, regain or grow their 
product-market share in post-crisis situations (such as after the terrorist 
events of 9/11). Regulatory intervention can create a negative signal to 
prospective policyholders and investors as to the future financial viability 
of insurance firms and as a result, lead to a loss of business and decline in 
product-market share. Doherty et al. (2003) and Doherty and Lamm-
Tennant (2009) also emphasize that, as noted earlier, reinsurance allows 
primary insurers to increase their underwriting capacity, diversify 
assumed risks, and realize potentially profitable investment opportunities 
in times of uncertainty. Moreover, the financial ratings of insurance firms 
are largely voluntary (Adams, Burton and Hardwick, 2003) and so do not 
apply to all insurers in the market. As such, reinsurance provides a more 
comprehensive and easily accessible source of information on insurers' 
prospects for interested parties. These strategic advantages of 
reinsurance are expected not only to reduce the costs of capital for 
insurers but also to increase product-market share and associated free 
cash flows by assuring prospective policyholders, brokers, and industry 
regulators as to the future going concern of the insurance provider. The 
foregoing analysis thus leads us to hypothesize that: 
 
H: Reinsurance enables insurers to increase their product-market 
share. 
 
IV. Research Design  
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In this section we describe our research design including the 
specification of the modelling procedure, description of the data, and 
definition of the variables used. 
Baseline Model and Main Variables  
The baseline specification that we employ in the present study is 
similar to that used in prior studies examining the linkage between capital 
structure and product-market behavior (e.g., see Opler and Titman, 
1994; Campello, 2006; Fresard, 2010). Here we use one-step System 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-SYS) estimation procedure to 
estimate the dynamic relation between reinsurance and the product-
market share growth of UK non-life insurers over the 24 years 1987 to 
2010. The GMM-SYS specification has been shown to be efficient when 
there is temporal persistence in the endogenous series and unobserved 
heterogeneity in cross-sectional/time-series firm-level data. To the extent 
that unobserved heterogeneity represents missing and/or non-constant 
firm/time conditions (e.g., the possibility that new products launched by a 
firm under varying market states may affect the intensity of reinsurance 
over time) then GMM-SYS goes some way to mitigating the challenging 
issue of omitted variable bias (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and 
Bond, 1998; Bond, 2002). To control for potential endogeneity (e.g., 
between an insurer’s current product-market share and past years’ 
product-market performance and levels of reinsurance held), we use 
orthogonal deviations as instruments for the levels equation to maximize 
the number of observations utilized in the regression model (Wintoki, 
Linck and Netter, 2012)8. In addition, to minimize the number of GMM-
style instruments we use a collapsed form of the instrument matrix in our 
estimation (Roodman, 2009a). The maximum lag-depth of untransformed 
variables utilized as GMM-style instruments for each product-market has 
been kept approximately equal to the average number of observations 
per firm. This approach helps keep the instrument count low and so 
                                                 
8  Wintoki et al. (2012) point out that attempts to mitigate endogeneity through the use of 
instrumental variables can be challenging due to the difficulty of identifying suitable instruments. 
However, in sensitivity tests we use developed losses as an instrument for reinsurance ratio as 
prior studies (e.g. Cole and McCullough, 2006) suggest that it directly influences the level of 
reinsurance.   
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maintain the power of the Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions 
(Roodman, 2009b). Our GMM-SYS model is thus: 
 
           
                   
 
To mitigate the potentially confounding effects of idiosyncratic firm-
effects affecting the coefficient estimates, we adjust all firm-specific 
variables to their industry-year mean. This gives a more precise indicator 
of an insurer’s product-market position in a given year relative to its rivals 
(e.g. see Campello, 2006). We further expect that the annual amount of 
reinsurance purchased will vary across business lines in accordance with 
intrinsic differences in risk profiles and rates of new business growth9. 
Therefore, following Campello (2006) we standardize the ratio of annual 
reinsurance premiums ceded to gross annual premiums written (hereafter 
referred to as the ‘reinsurance ratio’) for each firm-year across all 
product-markets. This approach further enhances the ability of the 
variable REINS (named zREINS after standardization) to more precisely 
measure an insurance firm’s product-market position relative to that of its 
competitors. This arises as any competitive advantage to an insurer 
imparted by a higher reinsurance ratio depends on the dispersion of that 
ratio across the cross-sectional sample for a particular year in each line of 
business10.  
In our model, the dependent variable ∆PMSHAREit represents year-
on-year growth in product-market share for insurance firm ‘i’, where the 
product-market share of firm ‘i’ for a given year in a particular line is 
calculated as the ratio of net premiums written by the firm to total net 
                                                 
9 For example, John, Litov and Yeung (2008) note that corporate risk-taking, and hence the level 
of risk hedging (reinsurance spending), could be greater in lines of business with relatively high 
rates of growth. As a result, reinsurance and product-market growth trends could be driven by 
latent variables. 
 
10
 For standardization to be viable it is a requisite that the distribution of the reinsurance ratio is 
uni-modal and not highly skewed. To alleviate the potentially confounding effects of outliers we 
winsorize our variables at the 5% level at each tail. 
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premiums written at the industry level11. Our model also contains a lag of 
the dependent variable (∆PMSHAREit-1) to account for recent firm-specific 
initiatives (e.g., the adoption of new technology) that might influence an 
insurer’s product-market performance.  
The main explanatory variable of interest in our model is zREINSi,t-1 
which gauges the impact of reinsurance on ∆PMSHARE. To alleviate the 
possibility that the relation between product-market share and growth in 
the amount of reinsurance purchased by insurance firms may be 
endogenous we regress growth in product-market share on the 
reinsurance ratio (the level of reinsurance). Such an approach is useful 
because the reinsurance ratio represents the cumulative effects of 
reinsurance decisions taken in past periods, which reduces the potential 
for reverse causality between ∆PMSHARE and zREINS. We acknowledge 
that ∆PMSHARE may not adjust instantaneously to changes in the 
amounts of reinsurance purchased each year. Consequently, we use the 
first-lag of zREINS to allow for an insurer’s product-market share to 
adjust to annual changes in the amount of reinsurance purchased12. This 
procedure also captures the impact of multi-period arrangements that 
often characterize non-life reinsurance treaties, and further reduces the 
possibility of endogeneity between the dependent variable and the 
reinsurance ratio. In our model, we also control for five other firm-specific 
factors – leverage, liquidity, firm size, profitability, and selling expenses - 
that could influence the product-market performance of an insurer. Our 
motivation for entering these explanatory variables into our regression 
analysis is outlined briefly below. 
Control Variables 
                                                 
11 Net written premiums represent firm/industry turnover (price x quantity of risk coverage) and 
so represents a standard measure of productive activity in insurance markets. However, an insurer 
can increase its premiums by increasing risks assumed at higher prices rather than increasing the 
volume of new business sales per se. This raises the possibility of omitted variable bias. Therefore, 
in sensitivity tests we use the change in by-line claims incurred to total incurred claims as an 
alternative proxy of firm/market output. However, this measure may also be an imprecise proxy 
due to delays in reporting the quantum of losses particularly in so-called long-tail lines such as 
legal liability insurance. In the event, the two measures of product-market share were positively 
correlated and the empirical results qualitatively unchanged. Therefore, we conclude that omitted 
variable bias is not a significant issue in the present study. 
 
12 The change in the level of reinsurance purchased each year can either increase upwards (e.g., in 
anticipation of a more risky environment) or downwards (e.g., in periods of cash constraint). 
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To capture capital structure-effects on the product-market 
performance of insurance firms, we include leverage (LEV), as a control 
variable in our specification (e.g., see MacKay and Phillips, 2005; 
Campello, 2006). LEV is calculated as the annual ratio of net total 
liabilities (difference between total assets and policyholders’ surplus)13. 
Capital constrained insurance firms are likely to be at greater risk of 
financial distress and/or bankruptcy and as such, they are likely to have 
greater difficulty in attracting new customers and grow product-market 
share than insurers that are in a stronger financial condition (Zanjani, 
2002). 
Liquidity could also affect the product-market performance of firms 
(Fresard, 2010). However, as noted earlier, Gamba and Triantis (2008) 
note that a firm can retain a healthy stock of cash even if it is highly 
levered (e.g., in order to make future debt repayments). Therefore, 
highly levered insurers could generate free cash flows by increasing new 
business premiums. Therefore, a positive association can arise between 
the level of liquidity and leverage position of insurance firms. As a result, 
we control for the level of cash holdings (LIQ) in our model and measure 
LIQ as the ratio of year-end values of cash (and cash equivalents) to total 
net provisions.  
Additionally, size could impact on an insurer’s ability to grow product-
market share irrespective of the amount of reinsurance purchased – for 
example, big insurance firms tend to be naturally more diversified and 
have higher franchise values than small insurance firms (Zanjani, 2002). 
However, we expect liquidity to be decreasing in proportion with 
increased firm size as large firms are relatively less likely than small firms 
to rely on accumulated cash reserves to realize future growth options – 
for example, due to their ability to generally raise external finance at 
lower costs. Therefore, to capture the effect of firm size on product-
market performance as well as its interaction with other variables, we 
include firm size (SIZE) as a control variable in our model. SIZE is 
                                                 
13
 This variable is computed using all the values aggregated at the total business level as data on 
the by-line segregation of assets and surplus are not publicly available. 
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calculated as the natural log of total assets as the size of the firms in the 
insurance industry tends to be log-normally distributed.  
The product-market share of an insurance firm can also be directly 
influenced by prior years’ sales enhancing measures such as commissions 
paid to distributors and resources invested in internet technology (Brown 
and Goolsbee, 2002). Therefore, to account for interactions between 
these new business acquisition expenditures and an insurer’s product-
market performance, we include previous year’s sales and advertising 
expense (SEXPi,1-t) as a control variable in our specification. We define 
SEXP as total selling and advertising expenses incurred in acquiring new 
business scaled by the gross premiums written, where total selling 
expenses are the sum of sales commissions incurred (paid and payable) 
plus other new business acquisition costs. 
The generation of period earnings enables insurers to innovate and 
increase strategic investments in positive NPV projects. This attribute 
cansignal future financial strength to insurance markets and allow 
profitable insurers to command higher prices, which in turn leads to more 
profits, and growth of product-market share. In our model, PROFITi,t-1  is 
represented by the return on assets for each year and is calculated as the 
ratio of annual total pre-tax profit to total assets. A lagged variable is 
used as higher profits in a given period can enhance an insurance firm’s 
ability to finance infrastructural initiatives to increase future product-
market share (Campello, 2006). 
 
 
 
Additional Control and Instrument Variables 
Besides the control variables included in our baseline specification, 
few other variables may also have an effect on the product-market share 
growth of insurers. For example, Garven and Loubergé (1996) point out 
that reinsurance can be transacted in international reinsurance markets 
and/or internally via the reinsurance subsidiaries of conglomerate 
insurance groups. Garven and Loubergé (1996) report that both ways of 
transacting reinsurance can have economic advantages that can help 
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primary insurers grow product-market share. For example, external 
reinsurers can provide ceding insurers with valuable risk management 
advice, whilst internal reinsurance can help insurers realize economic 
benefits from savings in frictional costs. As a result, we model the effect 
of the use of external and internal reinsurance by incorporating a dummy 
variable (GROUPi,t-1 ), which equals 1 where an insurer is a member of a 
conglomerate, and 0 otherwise. 
As with size, we expect more diversified insurers to have a greater 
capacity to underwrite new business and thus achieve a higher growth in 
product-market share. Highly diversified insurers are also more likely to 
have greater access to various distribution channels that allow them to 
reach a larger number of potential customers, resulting in a higher growth 
in product-market share. Therefore, we use the line of business 
Herfindahl index as a measure of diversification. The line of business 
Herfindahl index is calculated as sum of square the share of individual 
lines in the total premiums written by an insurer in a given year. As 
mentioned in footnote 8, we test the sensitivity of our results using 
developed losses as an instrument for reinsurance in a two-stage IV 
estimation. Previous studies on determinants of reinsurance, such as Cole 
and McCullough (2006) use developed losses as one of the determinants 
of the reinsurance. Moreover, developed losses from prior years are 
unlikely to have a direct bearing on product-market share growth; 
however, they are expected to directly affect the level of premiums ceded 
by the primary insurers to their reinsurers. This makes developed losses a 
valid instrument for our study. We therefore define DEVLOSi,t-1 as the 
ratio of developed losses (for the past year) to total annual reserves. All 
the variables that enter our regression analysis are summarized in Table I 
 
[Insert Table I here] 
Firm/Time-Specific Effects 
The notations ηi and vt in our model represent unobserved firm-
specific and time-specific effects respectively. Due to the presence of both 
mono-line as well as multi-line insurers of varying sizes and ownership 
structures (e.g., management-owned) in our dataset, we expect there to 
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be firm heterogeneity; hence the variable ηi is included in the model to 
account for it. Additionally, to control for time effects which are likely to 
be present over a period of 24 years in an industrial sector that is well-
known to be cyclical (Cummins and Danzon, 1997), we include time 
(year) dummies in our regression.   
Data Description 
We fit our GMM-SYS model to unbalanced (1987-2010) panel data for 
insurance firms operating in five main lines of non-life insurance business, 
namely: motor, property, legal liability, personal accident, and 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance. We also estimate the same 
regression at the total business level of the insurance firm to investigate 
the cumulative effect of reinsurance on overall annual changes in product-
market share. The five product-markets analyzed comprise approximately 
95% of insurance underwritten in the UK’s non-life insurance sector. All 
data relate to UK non-life insurers taken from the Standard and Poor’s 
Synthesys insurance companies’ database for the 24 years, 1987 to 2010 
– a period when UK non-life insurers were in varying states of financial 
condition. The financial data that we use are sourced from the regulatory 
returns submitted annually by UK insurance companies to the insurance 
industry regulator - the FSA. The selected period of analysis represents 
the earliest and latest years for which complete data were available at the 
time our study was carried out. Also, we consider that the duration 
covered by our data set is sufficiently long to account for the possible 
effects of insurance underwriting cycles on our results. 
Our data set includes independently operating and reporting non-life 
insurance companies licensed by the FSA to conduct property-liability 
insurance business in the UK.14 Very small non-life insurance providers 
(including mutual fire insurance pools) and public sector insurance 
arrangements are excluded from the sample either because they do not 
directly and/or actively write much insurance business and/or complete 
                                                 
14
 The annual statutory returns do not provide consolidated financial statements for insurance 
groups and so we cannot conduct detailed tests on an intra-group basis. However, 
affilates/subsidiaries of insurers operating in the UK tend to have considerable discretion over 
reinsurance decisions in order to respond to prevailing product-market conditions and realize 
economic (e.g., tax)  benefits as well as local regulatory (e.g., capital) requirements . 
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data are not available. Furthermore, the vast majority of insurers in our 
data set (approximately 95%) are stock forms of organization, and the 
majority of these are non-publicly listed entities 15 . Underwriting 
syndicates operating at Lloyd’s are also excluded due to the unavailability 
of public data, their unique (triennial) system of accounting that was in 
place during much of our period of analysis 16 , and the different 
organizational structure of syndicates at Lloyd’s compared with 
conventional insurance firms (e.g., Lloyd’s syndicates are often owned 
and administered by managing agencies). 
Firm-years for which any one or more of equity, assets or reserves 
were reported as negative are also excluded from our data set. Moreover, 
in the interest of preserving the panel structure of our data, firms without 
two complete sets of observations are left out of the estimation sample. 
There are a handful of insurance firms in our sample that have been 
involved in mergers and acquisitions during our period of analysis. Some 
of them are key players in the UK insurance market and excluding them 
from our study could bias our results. Consequently, to circumvent this 
problem, we treat these conglomerate insurance groups as two separate 
entities – i.e., pre-and-post merger and/or acquisition. We further test for 
outliers in the lower and upper tails of the distribution of our data set and 
find that ΔPMSHARE and PROFIT have the highest number of outliers at 
689 and 836 outliers respectively. In order to minimize the effect of these 
extreme values, we winsorize all the variables used in estimations at top 
and bottom five percentile of observations in order to root-out extremities 
in the data17. In the next section, we briefly describe the key summary 
statistics for our sample that are reported in Table II. 
 
                                                 
15 The preponderance of non-publicly listed stock insurers precludes the need for us to control for 
both organizational form and listing status in the present study. 
 
16  Lloyd’s moved from a three years to annual system of accounting based on UK generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) on 1 January 2005. 
17 Alternative tests to control for the potentially confounding effects of extreme values (e.g., using 
logged values) did not yield intuitively meaningful results. Therefore, we consider winsorization to 
be the best way to control for extremities in our data set. In sensitivity tests conducted using the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) at the total business level and Generalized Second-stage 
Least Squares (G2SLS) instrumental variable procedure, we use variables winsorized at the first 
percentile of each tail. However, the results are qualitatively unchanged. 
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[Insert Table II here] 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 In this section of the paper we present and analyze our empirical 
results. 
 Summary Statistics 
Table II indicates that the size of insurance firms in our sample does 
not vary much by product-market, though there is some observable 
variation in sample sizes across market segments. This feature indicates 
that not all insurers in our data set serve all five insurance segments that 
are the focus of the present study. Average growth in product-market 
share (winsorized) for the five lines examined over the period of analysis 
range from 8% to 14%, although at the total business level it trails-off to 
an overall average of 6%. Similarly, standard deviations relative to the 
respective mean values across different lines suggest consistent rates of 
growth across the entire property-liability insurance market. Maximum 
values of by-business market share are also large relative to the 
corresponding average values. This could be due to the new entry of more 
(price and product) competitive insurers that make gains in product-
market share in the early years of operation as the result of the adoption 
of new technology and/or other innovative business strategies (Brown and 
Goolsbee, 2002).   
Table II indicates that average reinsurance ratios show more 
variation across segments of the non-life insurance market compared with 
rates of product-market share growth. Also, average levels of reinsurance 
to gross premiums written across the panel sample range from 15% in 
motor insurance to over 30% in property, liability, and miscellaneous and 
pecuniary lines of business. This observation further hints that insurers 
operating in different lines of business tend to have inherently different 
risk profiles and hence different demand profiles for reinsurance. Indeed, 
our expectation is that, all else equal, insurers underwriting standard and 
predictable risk business (e.g., motor insurance) are likely to have less 
need for reinsurance than their counterparts underwriting more complex 
and unpredictable risk business (e.g., legal liability and catastrophe risks) 
(e.g., see Froot, 2001; Froot and O’Connell, 2008; Ibragimov, Jaffee, and 
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Walden, 2009). This view tends to be borne out by Table II, which 
illustrates that the average by-line reinsurance ratio ranges from 14% to 
38%, with motor (a fairly predictable risk line) and miscellaneous and 
pecuniary loss (a relatively less predictable line) recording the lowest and 
highest values respectively. The average levels of leverage winsorized at 
5% (in both tails) range from 13% for motor insurance to 17% for the 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss line of insurance. Such a fairly uniform 
distribution of financial structure across segments of the market could 
highlight the fact that insurance is largely a solvency-regulated business 
where maintaining a consistent and moderate leverage ratio is of 
paramount importance to industry regulators (Mayers and Smith, 1990). 
A similar logic seems to apply to the dispersion of leverage as standard 
deviations across all lines as well as at the total business level takes a 
value of approximately 0.11. Average liquidity levels in our sample also 
appear to be highly variable across product-markets with values 
respectively ranging from 0.41 to 0.87 for motor and personal accident 
lines of business. Moreover, lines of insurance showing the greatest gains 
in product-market share tend to have higher liquidity levels, suggesting 
that as Rochet and Villeneuve (2011) argue, strategic capital, risk and 
liquidity management decisions tend to closely mirror growth 
opportunities in product-markets.  
Table II reveals that a potentially key determinant of product-market 
share growth - selling expenses - varies across different lines of insurance 
business. Interestingly, this variable also tracks the average level of share 
growth across different market segments such that lines experiencing 
high rates of product-market growth tend to incur high selling costs. 
Average selling expenses for our sample range from 18% of gross 
premiums written in case of standard motor insurance to 31% in case of 
the more specialized miscellaneous and pecuniary loss line of insurance 
business. However, at the total business level the mean annual value of 
selling expenses drops sharply to about 9% of gross premiums written. 
This trend implies that selling expenses rise when managers target lines 
of risk business that have sound strategic growth prospects such as 
miscellaneous and pecuniary loss products (e.g., financial and trade 
 21 
guarantee insurance). However, average profitability for all the insurers in 
our data both by-line and aggregate business level is modest - ranging 
from 2% to 4% of total assets. This result suggests that over the period 
of our analysis non-life insurance was generally not a high margin 
business.  
Line of business Herfindahl Index (HHI) and the group membership 
identifier (GROUP) are the additional control variables that are used in 
robustness tests. The vast majority of observations in our sample 
correspond to insurers with presence in more than one line of insurance. 
Liability insurance business has the lowest proportion of mono-line 
(“pure-play”) insurers (only 2.5%), whereas personal accident business 
has the highest proportion with approximately 12% of firm/year 
observations. Overall the nearly 20% of firm/year observations belong to 
mono-line companies. This also indicates that most of the firms in our 
estimation sample are multi-line insurers with a mean HHI of 0.62 at the 
total business level. Average HHI varies slightly among the product 
markets with liability insurers being the most diversified with a mean HHI 
of 0.45 and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss line having the highest 
mean of 0.54.  Similarly most of the companies in our estimation sample 
are affiliated to a group with only about 15% of observations relating to 
firms with no group affiliation. The proportion of observations 
corresponding to non-group companies range from a low of about 12% 
for personal accident insurance business to a high of approximately 17% 
for liability insurance business.  
We turn next to the correlation coefficient analysis. As different 
regressions are run for different product-markets, we compute correlation 
coefficients for nine sets of key variables. Whereas the same values of 
LIQ, LEV, SIZE, SEXP, PROFIT, HHI and GROUP are used in all the 
regressions; values of ∆PMSHARE, zREINS and DEVLOS change by line of 
insurance. Correlation coefficients corresponding to respective product-
markets and total business level are reported in panels A to F in Table III. 
 
[Insert Table III here] 
 22 
 Table III shows a weak, but statistically significant and positive 
correlation (at the 1% level, two-tail) between the dependent variable 
(∆PMSHARE) and main explanatory variable zREINS. Table II indicates 
consistent correlation coefficients of approximately 0.15 across all 
product-markets except at the total business level, where the coefficient 
drops down to 0.08. However, the association between the dependent 
variable and its lag is not consistent across different lines of insurance 
and statistically significant at conventional levels only for three product-
markets (motor, property, and personal accident) and at the total 
business level. Furthermore, the correlation coefficient ranges from 0.10 
for personal accident insurance to 0.15 for motor insurance. These 
relatively low correlations suggest that product-market growth 
momentum over time is weak – for example, as a result of growing 
competition. In addition, ∆PMSHARE is significant and negative, but 
weakly correlated (at the 5% level or better, two-tail) with SIZE across all 
lines of business with the degree of correlation being similar for all lines. 
This result indicates that large insurers tend to find it difficult to sustain 
high levels of product-market share growth year-on-year. That is, the 
same absolute value of growth translates into a lower percentage for 
larger insurance firms relative to smaller insurance firms.  
In our dataset, moderate and statistically significant correlation 
coefficients (at the 1% level, two-tail) are observed between zREINS and 
LEV with coefficients ranging from 0.29 to 0.46 across different product-
markets. This observation accords with some prior studies (e.g., Shiu, 
2011) and suggests that highly levered insurers tend to buy more 
reinsurance than lowly levered insurance firms. Table III further indicates 
negative and statistically significant correlations (at the 1% level, two-
tail) between firm size and the reinsurance ratio indicating that compared 
with small insurers, large insurers are likely to be relatively less reliant on 
reinsurance – for example, because they tend to be more naturally 
diversified. Moreover, larger insurers generally have greater access to 
capital markets than small insurers, and as such, they have relatively 
more options to raise risk finance (Jarzabkowski, Bednareh, Burke, 
Cabantous and Smets, 2012). Moderate but statistically significant inverse 
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correlations (at the 1% level, two-tail) between firm size and liquidity 
reported in Table III also implies that large insurers tend to hold 
proportionately fewer liquid assets than their smaller counterparts, and 
rely more on future cash flows from in-force business to maintain future 
solvency levels and underwriting capacity.  
HHI has a strong negative correlation with size and the group 
identifier across all the lines of insurance. This is expected as larger 
insurers are usually more diversified firms, and they also tend to be part 
of a conglomerate group. Similarly, there is a negative correlation 
between HHI and zREINS for some lines as more diversified insurers 
(lower HHI score) tend to cede a lower proportion of their premiums 
compared with their less diversified counterparts. As expected, DEVLOS 
variable is statistically significantly correlated with zREINS thereby 
supporting its use as an instrument for the reinsurance ratio. 
 
Multivariate Results  
GMM Diagnostics 
As noted earlier, one-step GMM-SYS is used to test the research 
hypothesis put forward in section II. Although the two-step GMM-SYS 
estimator is asymptotically superior, the finite sample properties of the 
one-step GMM-SYS estimator are more useful than two-step estimator. 
For instance, Bond, Hoeffler and Temple (1998, p.18) state that “ . . . in 
finite samples, the asymptotic standard errors associated with the two-
step GMM estimators can be seriously biased downwards, and thus form 
an unreliable guide for inference”. Blundell and Bond (1998) also suggest 
that apart from being asymptotically robust to heteroskedasticity, finite 
sample estimates of the one-step system estimator are more reliable and 
consistent. To minimize the risk of biased standard errors due to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation between firm/years, our regression 
is estimated using robust standard errors. We run our baseline 
specification individually for each line of insurance business and present 
the consolidated results in Table IV.  
 
[Insert Table IV here] 
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 To check the validity of our model’s specification and instruments 
used in the GMM-SYS estimation, the Hansen test of over-identifying 
restrictions, and the Difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity of GMM-style 
instruments are reported in Table IV. The results of Hansen test of over-
identifying restrictions given in Table IV indicate that our GMM-SYS 
specification is not over-identified. Furthermore, the Hansen test for 
exogeneity of GMM-style instruments does not reject the null hypothesis 
of instrument validity and so indicates that the instrument set used is 
suitable in context of our specification. Moreover, in accordance with our 
expectations, AR(1), AR(2) and AR(3) statistics reported in Table IV 
above confirm the presence of first-order autocorrelation in error term in 
differences (significant at the 1% level, two-tail) across all the business 
lines; while second order autocorrelation too is statistically significant at 
10% level (two-tail) in the case of property insurance. Our dataset admits 
lags equal to or higher than two as GMM–style instruments for all the 
product-markets investigated. Hence, we estimate our specification using 
lags ranging from second lag to the twelfth lag in our estimations. As 
discussed in section III (A), the upper limit of lag depth is set 
approximately equal to the average number of observations per group for 
each product-market examined. The instrument count reported for each 
line of business also remains at an acceptable range, i.e., below the 
number of firms included in the estimation for each segment of the non-
life insurance market examined. 
Main Results 
 Consistent with what was hypothesized our main explanatory 
variable - zREINS - has a statistically significant and positive impact on 
∆PMSHARE at the 10% level (two-tail) or better across all lines of 
insurance business. However, the influence of zREINS on ∆PMSHARE 
shows slight by-line variation with the greatest impact being experienced 
in the property insurance sector. This reflects the exposure of property to 
increased catastrophe risks such as flooding and storm damage as a 
result of factors such as lax development controls and climate change 
(e.g., see Browne and Hoyt, 2000). Our results establish economic 
significance of reinsurance as a strategic tool as after controlling for five 
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control variables, one standard deviation increase in the reinsurance ratio 
from the industry-year mean leads to product-market share growth 
(above their line-year mean) in the range of 13% in motor insurance to 
21% in property insurance18. 
Contrary to what was expected, Table IV shows that ∆PMSHAREi,t-1 
does not influence insurers’ ability to realize growth in all product-markets 
except for property insurance where the lagged dependent variable is 
significant (at the 5% level, two-tail). The lagged dependent variable is, 
however, statistically significant (at the 1% level, two-tail) at the total 
business level. The economic effect gleaned from Table IV is that a 
standard deviation increase in the product-market share growth from 
industry-year mean in year t-1 grows product-market share by 7.8% 
points in year t. These results could reflect a ‘momentum-effect’ in the 
rate of growth in the product-market share of insurance firms as a result 
of past investment (e.g., in new technology). Similarly, the coefficient 
estimate for LEVi,t-1 is only negative and statistically significant in the case 
of property insurance and at the total business level (at the 10% and 1% 
levels two-tail, respectively). At the total business level, a standard 
deviation reduction in leverage below the product-market year average 
leads to a 6.5% points gain in product-market share in the next year.  
Prior research (e.g., Campello, 2006) predicts that high leverage 
levels in the past can lead to a current loss of product-market share for 
firms because of the heightened effects of financial distress and 
insolvency. Consequently, an increase in insurers’ leverage, particularly in 
competitive sectors, such as property insurance, could be perceived by 
brokers/agents and policyholders as increasing the probability of ruin. 
This could trigger a ‘flight to quality’ and a consequential loss of product-
market share for highly levered insurance firms operating in competitive 
segments of the market. However, as previous studies (e.g., Doherty and 
Tinic, 1981; Doherty et al., 2003; Weiss and Chung, 2004) point out, 
reinsurance can be used to mitigate the risk of financial distress and/or 
bankruptcy for highly levered insurance firms and so enable them to 
                                                 
18 The economic significance is computed as follows: for example, for motor insurance 2.6% points 
= 0.20 (standard deviation per Table II) x 0.13 (coefficient estimate per Table IV). 
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assure prospective policyholders and so grow product-market share in 
competitive lines of insurance business19. 
Table IV illustrates that LIQi,1-t has a statistically significant effect on 
product-market share growth for two lines – personal accident and legal 
liability insurance (at the 10% and 5% levels two-tail, respectively). Not 
surprisingly, these two lines also show the highest variation in levels of 
liquidity (i.e., in terms of the high standard deviation relative to the mean 
value of liquidity). Hence, firms with high liquidity ratios relative to their 
rivals tend to have competitive advantages in personal accident and legal 
liability lines of insurance. However, the economic significance of the 
‘liquidity effect’ is modest in that a unit increase in the liquidity ratio 
above the product-market year mean improves product-market share by 
roughly 10% to 11% points for personal accident and legal liability 
insurance. One plausible explanation for this observation is that indemnity 
contracts such as reinsurance can help insurers protect their cash 
resources against depletion as a result of greater than anticipated loss 
events. This attribute can help primary insurers not only to protect their 
solvency margins but also enable them to realize positive NPV projects in 
their investment opportunity sets (Doherty, 2000). The cash protection 
facility of reinsurance could become more important for UK (and indeed, 
EU) insurers as a result of the more stringent capital maintenance and 
risk management rules of Solvency II that are due to be implemented 
after 1 January 2016. It is possible that the statutory solvency monitoring 
regulations that characterize the UK, and other insurance markets could 
help explain the apparent inconsistency with regard the liquidity findings 
of recent cross-sectional research (e.g., Fresard, 2010). This research 
suggests that cash rich firms are likely to secure product-market share 
gains at the expense of cash constrained rivals, particularly after 
macroeconomic shocks such as the recent global financial crisis.  
                                                 
19
 As was noted earlier in section V, a direct association between zREINS and LEV is observed in 
our estimation sample across all product-markets. Therefore, to test the robustness of our 
estimates to multicollinearity that may arise due to high correlation between the regressors, we 
re-estimated our model using an alternative specification that excluded LEV. The results obtained 
from these estimations are qualitatively similar to those reported in this paper. We also re-
estimated our model with annual sales growth as the dependent variable. Annual sales growth is 
defined as the annual change in net premiums written. Again, the coefficient estimates are similar 
to those originally estimated, and so in the interest of brevity they are not reported here. 
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With regard to firm size, we observe that product-market share 
growth does not respond consistently to variations in size across all 
product-markets. The coefficient estimate for SIZEi,t-1 is statistically 
significant and negative for two lines of business, namely motor insurance 
and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss (at the 1% and 5% levels, two-tail, 
respectively). This finding suggests that over the period of analysis, small 
insurers operating in these two segments of the market have increased 
new business at the expense of larger competitors – for example, as a 
result of product innovation and/or the use of new technology 20 . 
Additionally, in such niche segments of the non-life insurance market the 
real advisory services of reinsurers could provide another competitive 
benefit to small but innovative niche players (e.g., see Jean Baptiste and 
Santomero, 2000)21. 
Prior studies (e.g., MacKay and Phillips, 2005; Adam et al., 2007; 
Campello et al., 2011) make clear that compared with small firms large 
entities are often better placed to use their brand profile and stock of cash 
resources to improve their market share through geographical as well as 
product-market diversification. However, in the present study the 
observed relation is reversed for the lagged value of firm size, suggesting 
that the effect of ‘firm size inflation’ in the past years could result in a loss 
of product-market share in the future as large insurance firms lose their 
competitive edge to smaller rivals operating in niche segments of the 
market. This might be due to combination of factors – for example, 
managerial inertia in the case of larger insurers and/or the possibility that 
new entrants in a product-market grow very fast in the early years as a 
result of competitive pricing, more innovative products, and/or providing 
better quality customer services.  
                                                 
20 For example, Direct Line is a typical example of a relatively small (in terms of assets-in-place) 
but specialist UK-based insurer operating in the motor insurance segment of the non-life insurance 
market. 
 
21 Since the size of an insurer tends to correspond closely with its age, we include firm age as an 
explanatory variable to test the robustness of our results to the length of time an insurer has been 
operating in the respective product-markets that are the focus of the present study. We find that 
whereas age is a statistically significant predictor for motor insurance line (at p≤0.1, two tailed), 
the same is not true for other lines. However, the interpretation of our results remains largely 
unchanged after inclusion of the firm age variable. 
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Table IV reveals that the lagged values of new business acquisition 
expenses to gross premiums written (sales) ratio (i.e., SEXPi,1-t) does not 
have the expected positive effect on the product-market share growth of 
insurance firms. This observation therefore suggests that overall, the UK’s 
non-life insurance market has for many years been operating at, or close 
to, saturation point with limited scope for new business growth. 
Furthermore, Profitt-1 (return on assets) does not have any discernible 
effect on the product-market performance of UK non-life insurers except 
for those operating in the motor insurance sector. It is therefore likely 
that due to the lower barriers of entry and competitive nature of the 
motor vehicle insurance segment of the market more efficient and 
profitable firms experience higher market share growth as well. Such 
efficiency enhancements may be the result of investments in new 
technology and/or business processes which come as a consequence of 
highly profitable operations.  
Robustness Tests 
 We test the sensitivity of our baseline results reported above using 
an instrumental variable (IV) estimator based on the G2SLS approach. 
The model we use is essentially a random-effects estimator that 
instruments the reinsurance ratio by developed losses, and includes 
additional control variables GROUPi,t-1 and HHIi,t-1. Since GROUP is a time 
invariant variable for all the firms in our sample, the use of a fixed-effects 
estimator is ruled out. Moreover, our data being derived from a single 
industry, it is likely to meet the assumptions of the random-effects model, 
which allows us to include the group identifier in our estimation. We 
further assume that firm-specific effects in our data are random 
realizations of a data generating process common to all insurers. Table V 
reports the second-stage results from this estimation. The equation is 
exactly identified as only one instrument has been used for the 
reinsurance ratio, the main endogenous variable. There is a slight 
difference in the sample sizes between our baseline and IV estimates 
because the number of observations available for estimation in IV 
regressions is dependent on the availability of observations of the 
instrument. The IV estimation includes two more variables than the 
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baseline model, namely HINDX and GROUP, which is likely to result in 
coefficient estimates that are different from the baseline model. 
Moreover, in the case of the IV estimates, the winsorization has been 
done at first percentile at each tail, which results in a larger variation in 
values of our variables. Furthermore, based on the minimum covariance 
determinant of Rousseeuw (1985), approximately 10% of total 
observations remain influential after winsorization at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles at the lower and upper tails respectively. The difference in 
coefficient estimates of Tables IV and V appears to be the cumulative 
effect of these extreme values.  
[Insert Table V here] 
The estimates at the total business level are in agreement with the 
baseline estimates. The coefficient estimates for the property insurance 
business are also similar in sign and significance to the baseline 
estimates, though differ in magnitude22. To examine further the time-
sensitivity of our results to changing macro-economic and insurance 
market conditions we conducted a sensitivity test for the effects of the 
2007/8 global financial crisis using a dummy variable - CRISISit - that 
represents 1 before 2008, and 0 otherwise. However, our results 
(unreported) indicate that the variable CRISISit does not have any 
statistically significant effect on market share growth in any of the lines 
investigated. Moreover, the estimates produced by these regressions are 
in line with those produced by IV regressions.  
Test for Non-linearity 
Although the aforementioned analysis reveals that there is a 
positive relation between the reinsurance ratio and market-share growth, 
there is still a possibility that this relation is non-monotonic. To 
investigate this possibility, we conducted further regressions after parsing 
                                                 
22  Some of the coefficients in Table V are quite large in magnitude and we suspect that few 
influential values of respective variables drive these results. Owing to this limitation, we do not 
attach economic significance to these results and present them here only as tests for direction of 
relations rather than as predictive estimates. To investigate the possibility whether the magnitudes 
of coefficients are influenced by the magnitude of observations, we investigate the effect of the 
variation in cession rates on market share growth in the following section. 
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the dataset into four subsets based on quartiles of lagged value of 
zREINS.  
 
[Insert Table VI & Figure 1 here] 
Table VI reports the results of these regressions, which reveal that 
though the relation between the reinsurance ratio and the market share 
growth is positive for all the subsets of observations, it is statistically 
significant only for observations corresponding to higher than the median 
reinsurance ratio. It can also be observed that the magnitude of 
coefficient estimates corresponding to varying level of reinsurance ratio 
vary from one quartile to another. As shown by Figure 1, this outcome 
suggests that the firms with higher than median reinsurance ratio 
experience higher product-market share growth than their less reinsured 
rivals adding weight to conclusions drawn using preceding analyses. This 
also hints at a piecewise linear relation between the dependent and the 
main explanatory variable. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Utilizing a one-step dynamic panel data design (GMM-SYS) on data 
gathered from five main segments of the UK’s non-life insurance market 
for 1987 to 2010 we find that overall reinsurance plays an important role 
in enabling insurers to realize gains in product-market share. Specifically, 
we observe that an increase in reinsurance leads to significant gains in 
product-market share for insurers at the expense of insurers that are less 
reinsured. However, the extent of the realized gain in product-market 
share differs across business lines as a result of variations in the type and 
scale of risks insured as well as by-line differences in the use of 
reinsurance.  
We also find that the effect of reinsurance in securing growth in 
product-market share is amplified for highly levered insurers at the total 
business level but not at the individual product-market level, with the 
exception of property insurance. Similarly, insurers’ liquidity levels do not 
influence growth in product-markets except in two lines – personal 
accident and legal liability insurance. This could reflect ‘liquidity 
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convergence’ among insurers as a result of statutory minimum solvency 
requirements. Indeed, this process could be exacerbated after 2016 with 
the implementation of the EU’s new Solvency II risk-based capital 
maintenance rules. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the rate of product-
market share growth to changes in leverage varies across business lines. 
However, possible negative impacts on product-market share growth due 
to past increases in insurers’ leverage levels could be mitigated by 
purchasing reinsurance.  
Surprisingly, except for motor vehicle and miscellaneous and 
pecuniary loss lines of insurance, firm size does not appear to be a vital 
factor in driving growth in product-market share. In these business lines 
small (niche) insurance firms appear to have captured relatively more 
gains in product-market share from using reinsurance than large insurers. 
This observation further suggests that the risk management and other 
real advisory services provided by reinsurers could help smaller 
innovative players in these market segments to mitigate inherent 
advantages bestowed by larger firm size such as brand-name recognition 
and ability to effectively diversify risks underwritten.  
Our research results could have potential commercial and/or public 
policy implications. For example, managers of highly levered insurance 
firms could purchase reinsurance to increase future cash flows from 
opportune infrastructural/new technology investments that grow product-
market share at the expense of competitors. This attribute could provide 
comfort to investors, policyholders, industry regulators, and others as to 
the probability of highly levered insurance firms remaining as going 
concerns. In addition, our observation that reinsurance enables small 
(niche) insurers to improve their position in competitive product-markets, 
such as motor insurance, suggests that it enhances consumer choice and 
lowers prices. This attribute is likely to be of policy relevance to industry 
regulators, legislators, consumer groups, amongst others that have an 
interest in the efficient and effective operation of insurance markets. 
 Finally, the strategic impact of risk management techniques, such as 
reinsurance, is an important but relatively under-researched area in the 
finance literature. We believe that the results of this study could help 
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spawn some interesting future strategic risk finance research from 
insurance markets in other (e.g., developing) countries as well as 
different industrial sectors of the economy (e.g., banking).  
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Table I 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: Definition of Variables 
This table presents the labels of the key variables used in the study together with their full 
description. 
Variable Represents Description 
∆PMSHAREi,t 
Product-market 
share growth 
PMSHAREit is the by-line amount of annual 
growth in net premiums written (NPW).  
∆PMSHAREi,t is calculated as PMSHAREi,t minus 
PMSHAREi,t-1 divided by PMSHAREi,t-1, minus the 
industry/line year mean. 
zREINSi,t 
Level of 
reinsurance 
ceded 
By-line amount of reinsurance premiums ceded 
in year t divided by the gross insurance 
premiums written in year t. 
LIQi,t 
Level of cash 
holdings 
Ratio of cash (& cash equivalents) to net 
provisions and reserves in year t. 
LEVi,t Leverage 
Difference between total assets and total 
surplus (sum of Equity and Reserves) scaled by 
total assets in year t 
SIZEi,t Firm size Natural log of total assets in year t. 
SEXPi,t 
Business 
acquisition 
expenses 
 
Total selling and advertising expenses (total of 
commissions paid/payable to distributors plus 
other acquisition costs) scaled by the gross 
premiums written in year t. 
PROFITi,t Return on assets 
Ratio of earnings before tax to total assets in 
year t. 
HHI 
Line of business 
Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index 
Sum of square of share of each line in a firm’s 
annual premiums written. 
GROUP 
Group 
membership 
Takes value 1 if insurer is part of a group and 0 
otherwise. 
DEVLOS 
Developed loss 
ratio 
Developed losses over the past year scaled by 
total surplus. 
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Table II 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: Descriptive 
Statistics 
This table reports the overall (winsorized at 5% level at each tail (except for HHI and GROUP)) 
descriptive statistics of the estimation sample by line of insurance business for the entire period of 
analysis. All variables are as defined in Table I. 
Variable Statistic Motor Property 
Legal 
Liability 
Pers. 
Acc. 
Misc. & 
Pecuniar
y 
Total 
Busines
s 
∆PMSHARE 
Mean 0.08 0.12 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.06 
Std. Dev. 0.41 0.54 0.53 0.65 0.66 0.39 
Min -0.66 -0.75 -0.76 -0.76 -0.79 -0.74 
Max 1.51 1.82 2.04 2.48 2.55 1.53 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
REINS 
Mean 0.15 0.38 0.32 0.24 0.38 0.33 
Std. Dev. 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.25 
Min 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
Max 0.97 0.98 1.00 0.97 0.99 0.93 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
LEV 
Mean 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16 
Std. Dev. 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Min 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
Max 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
LIQ 
Mean 0.41 0.74 0.51 0.87 0.80 0.77 
Std. Dev. 0.67 1.23 0.85 1.52 1.29 1.27 
Min 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Max 8.15 8.29 8.15 8.19 8.28 8.06 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
SIZE 
Mean 12.50 11.69 12.05 11.86 11.67 11.64 
Std. Dev. 1.61 1.81 1.65 1.78 1.77 1.80 
Min 8.15 7.36 7.36 7.36 7.36 7.37 
Max 14.49 14.49 14.49 14.49 14.50 14.47 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
SEXP 
Mean 0.18 0.28 0.24 0.31 0.31 0.09 
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.12 0.12 0.18 0.19 0.08 
Min 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Max 0.43 0.57 0.52 0.73 0.82 0.30 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
PROFIT 
Mean 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.03 
Std. Dev. 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Min -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 
Max 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 
No. of Obs. 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613 
HHI 
Mean 0.49 0.51 0.45 0.53 0.54 0.62 
Std. Dev. 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.28 
Min 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.16 
No. of Obs. 1193 1910 1238 1430 1657 2922 
GROUP 
0 145 252 211 170 206 428 
1 1048 1658 1027 1260 1451 2494 
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Table III 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: Correlation Coefficient Matrix 
This table presents the correlation coefficient matrix for the main variables examined in this study. Correlation coefficients are computed using Pearson 
Product Moment Correlation Analysis for each line of insurance business detailed in panels A to F below. All variables are as defined in Table I. 
Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). 
 
Panel A: Motor Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.15*** 
         zREINSt-1  0.14
***
 0.02 
        LEVt-1 -0.02 -0.05
*
 0.31
***
 
       LIQt-1  0.08
**
 0.06
*
 0.13
***
 0.03 
      SIZEt-1 -0.14
***
 -0.16
***
 -0.26
***
 0.07
**
 -0.38
***
 
     SEXPt-1 -0.04 -0.19
***
 0.31
***
 0.19
***
 0.03 -0.06
**
 
    PROFITt-1  0.01 -0.12
***
 -0.03 0.06
**
 0.10
***
 0.09
***
 -0.11
***
 
   HHIt-1 -0.00  0.02  0.03 -0.24***  0.08*** -0.50***  0.02  0.01 
  GROUPt-1  0.02  0.03  0.05*  0.13*** -0.00  0.11*** -0.03 -0.03 -0.06** 
 DEVLOSt-1 -0.08*** -0.07**  0.02 -0.22*** -0.10*** -0.20*** -0.10*** -0.09***  0.56***  0.06** 
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Panel B: Property Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.06*** 
         zREINSt-1  0.15
***
 -0.07
***
 
        LEVt-1 -0.02 -0.01 0.33
***
 
       LIQt-1  0.03
*
 0.05
**
 0.22
***
 0.14
***
 
      SIZEt-1 -0.04
**
 -0.04
*
 -0.20
***
 -0.03 -0.39
***
 
     SEXPt-1  0.02 -0.13
***
 0.32
***
 0.10
***
 0.06
***
 -0.02 
    PROFITt-1  0.03 -0.03 -0.02 0.11
***
 0.13
***
 -0.03 -0.09
***
 
   HHIt-1  0.04**  0.02 -0.16*** -0.03*  0.09*** -0.50***  0.11***  0.12*** 
  GROUPt-1  0.05**  0.05**  0.09***  0.02  0.00  0.11***  0.00 -0.00 -0.23*** 
 DEVLOSt-1 -0.10*** -0.08*** -0.19*** -0.02 -0.09*** -0.25*** -0.04* -0.10***  0.25*** -0.14*** 
 
 
Panel C: Legal Liability Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.03 
         zREINSt-1  0.16
***
 0.01 
        LEVt-1  0.04 0.02 0.40
***
 
       LIQt-1  0.10
***
 0.08
***
 0.16
***
 0.12
***
 
      SIZEt-1 -0.09
***
 -0.10
***
 -0.24
***
 0.01 -0.35
***
 
     SEXPt-1  0.05
*
 -0.10
***
 0.35
***
 0.16
***
 0.12
***
 -0.09
***
 
    PROFITt-1  0.01 -0.01 -0.07
***
 0.03 0.05
**
 0 -0.02 
   HHIt-1  0.03  0.03 -0.00 -0.18***  0.14*** -0.44***  0.09***  0.06** 
  GROUPt-1  0.03 -0.00  0.11***  0.18*** -0.01  0.24***  0.00 -0.11*** -0.41*** 
 DEVLOSt-1 -0.06** -0.05** -0.05** -0.19*** -0.07*** -0.16*** -0.06** -0.09***  0.09*** -0.09*** 
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Panel D: Personal Accident 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.10*** 
         zREINSt-1  0.17
***
 0 
        LEVt-1  0.01 -0.01 0.30
***
 
       LIQt-1  0.02 0.02 -0.01 0.18
***
 
      SIZEt-1 -0.06
**
 -0.10
***
 -0.13
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.44
***
 
     SEXPt-1  0.05
*
 -0.07
**
 0.30
***
 0.10
***
 0.06
**
 -0.07
***
 
    PROFITt-1 -0.06
**
 -0.09
***
 -0.11
***
 0.09
***
 0.33
***
 -0.16
***
 0.04 
   HHIt-1  0.01  0.02 -0.24*** -0.02  0.12*** -0.48***  0.09***  0.18*** 
  GROUPt-1  0.01  0.03  0.12***  0.11***  0.03  0.00  0.10*** -0.01 -0.19*** 
 DEVLOSt-1 -0.05**  0.00 -0.14***  0.04* -0.06*** -0.31***  0.03  0.06**  0.38***  0.10*** 
 
Panel E: Miscellaneous and Pecuniary Loss Insurance 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.03 
         zREINSt-1  0.14
***
 -0.07
***
 
        LEVt-1  0.01 -0.01 0.33
***
 
       LIQt-1  0.04
*
 0.05
**
 0.09
***
 0.25
***
 
      SIZEt-1 -0.07
***
 -0.07
***
 -0.14
***
 -0.16
***
 -0.42
***
 
     SEXPt-1 -0.02 -0.18
***
 0.14
***
 0.07
***
 0.07
***
 0.07
***
 
    PROFITt-1 -0.06
**
 -0.07
***
 -0.09
***
 0.17
***
 0.27
***
 -0.18
***
 0.01 
   HHIt-1 -0.00 -0.00 -0.23***  0.07***  0.09*** -0.55***  0.10***  0.28*** 
  GROUPt-1  0.03  0.03 -0.00  0.03 -0.02  0.11***  0.07*** -0.00 -0.24*** 
 DEVLOSt-1 -0.02 -0.03 -0.13***  0.10*** -0.02 -0.29*** -0.00  0.05**  0.40*** -0.04* 
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Panel F: Total Business 
  ∆PMSHARE ∆PMSHAREt-1 zREINSt-1 LEVt-1 LIQt-1 SIZEt-1 SEXPt-1 PROFITt-1 HHIt-1 GROUPt-1 
∆PMSHAREt-1  0.14*** 
         zREINSt-1  0.08
***
 -0.09
***
 
        LEVt-1 -0.05
**
 -0.06
***
 0.46
***
 
       LIQt-1  0.06
***
 0.04
**
 0.16
***
 0.11
***
 
      SIZEt-1 -0.05
***
 -0.03
*
 -0.22
***
 -0.03
*
 -0.40
***
 
     SEXPt-1 -0.02 -0.10
***
 0.04
**
 0.07
***
 0.11
***
 -0.25
***
 
    PROFITt-1  0.02 -0.03
*
 -0.06
***
 0.10
***
 0.13
***
 -0.041
**
 0.03 
   HHIt-1  0.00  0.00 -0.24*** -0.04**  0.08*** -0.50***  0.08***  0.16*** 
  GROUPt-1  0.02  0.04**  0.07***  0.08***  0.02  0.08*** -0.00  0.01 -0.18*** 
 DEVLOSt-1 -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.17***  0.15*** -0.07*** -0.28*** -0.11***  0.02 
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Table IV 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: GMM Results 
This table presents the results of the one-step system GMM regression estimation that tests the effects of the reinsurance ratio on the annual growth in 
market share in each of the five respective product-markets examined in this study. The product-markets examined are: motor, property, legal liability, 
personal accident, and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance. Also reported are the results of tests conducted at the total business level. The 
validity of the specification and instruments is reported using Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions and Difference-in-Hansen tests, respectively. 
AR(1) and AR(2) report the results of the Arellano-Bond test in first-differences to test for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbance term εit.. All 
variables are as defined in Table I. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (two-tail). Values in 
parentheses adjacent to test statistics AR(1), AR(2), AR(3), Hansen test and Difference-in-Hansen test denote corresponding p-values.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
∆PMSHARE t-1 0.08 0.063 0.09** 0.040 -0.04 0.068 0.05 0.045 -0.02 0.073 0.20*** 0.054
zREINS t-1 0.13** 0.054 0.21*** 0.045 0.15** 0.072 0.14* 0.072 0.15** 0.064 0.19*** 0.048
LEV t-1 0.34 0.328 -0.41* 0.249 -0.42 0.329 -0.09 0.474 -0.09 0.428 -0.59** 0.244
LIQ t-1 -0.01 0.049 -0.02 0.026 0.12** 0.058 0.07* 0.042 0.06 0.043 0.01 0.017
SIZE t-1 -0.17*** 0.051 0.01 0.055 -0.02 0.068 -0.03 0.071 -0.19** 0.079 0.04 0.047
SEXP t-1 -0.2 0.512 -0.21 0.287 -0.81 0.594 -0.1 0.243 -0.2 0.230 -0.42 0.455
PROFIT t-1 0.67* 0.343 0.11 0.248 0.25 0.366 -1.62 1.025 -0.62 0.395 0.12 0.191
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
AR(1) -6.39 (0.00) -8.29 (0.00) -4.87 (0.00) -6.76 (0.00) -5.07 (0.00) -7.31 (0.00)
AR(2) 1.04 (0.30) 1.92 (0.06) 0.41 (0.68) 0.57 (0.57) 1.53 (0.13) 1.15 (0.25)
AR(3) -0.46 (0.65) -0.57 (0.57) -1.52 (0.13) -0.38 (0.70) -0.59 (0.56) 0.76 (0.45)
Hansen Test 69.36 (0.27) 79.68 (0.40) 75.16 (0.32) 56.33 (0.71) 79.13 (0.41) 68.9 (0.73)
Difference-in-
Hansen Test
6.67 (0.46) 4.44 (0.73) 10.77 (0.15) 7.09 (0.42) 9.97 (0.19) 8.16 (0.32)
Observations (N) 1159 2401 1716 1410 1899 2613
Firms (N) 116 219 173 162 193 233
Instruments (N) 94 108 101 94 108 108
Lag range used 2 - 10 2 - 12 2 - 11 2 - 10 2 - 12 2 - 12
Tot. Business
∆MKTSHARE
Motor Property Legal Liability Pers. Acc. Misc. & Pecuniary
 43 
Table V 
UK Property-Liability Insurers, 1987-2010: IV Estimates using Random Effects (G2SLS) Estimator 
This table presents the results of the two-stage random effects regression estimation that tests the effects of the reinsurance ratio on the annual growth 
in market share in each of the five respective product-markets examined in this study. The product-markets examined are: motor, property, legal 
liability, personal accident, and miscellaneous and pecuniary loss insurance. Developed losses are used as the instrument for reinsurance ratio in the 
first-stage (not reported) regressions. The variables used are winsorized at 1% level on both tails. Year-dummies have been used to account for time 
specific effects. All variables are as defined in Table I. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
(two-tail).  
 
  
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
Coeff.
Robust 
Std. Err.
∆PMSHARE t-1  0.044 0.033  0.112*** 0.019  0.071 0.061  0.024 0.021  0.034 0.024  0.09*** 0.013
zREINS t-1 -1.187 0.73  0.758*** 0.17  4.339 3.423  2.274*** 0.809  1.071 0.833  0.599*** 0.232
LEV t-1  3.075 1.929 -1.661*** 0.42 -4.531 3.499 -2.787** 1.308 -2.089 1.6 -0.912** 0.391
LIQ t-1  0.05*** 0.013 -0.005*** 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.002  0 0.001
SIZE t-1 -0.171** 0.069  0.067*** 0.022  0.133 0.137  0.076 0.075  0.017 0.056 -0.01 0.019
SEXP t-1 -0.555** 0.252  0.447*** 0.106  0.116 0.102  1.242*** 0.229  0.304** 0.135  0.114 0.094
PROFIT t-1 -0.524 0.599  0.671** 0.301  1.618 1.408  0.267 0.867 -0.784 0.735 -0.105 0.21
GROUP t-1  0.214* 0.124  0.07 0.08 -0.448 0.679 -0.377 0.36  0.479* 0.275  0.059 0.062
HHI t-1 -0.194 0.181  0.793*** 0.188  0.168 0.521  1.155* 0.613  1.229* 0.718  0.238 0.151
Constant  2.103 0.592  0.05 0.182  0.826 1.035  0.802 0.581 -0.11 0.552  0.147 0.232
Time dummies
Observations (N)  1193  1910  1238  1430  1657  2922
Firms (N)  113  173  128  143  159  242
Min obs per firm  2  2  2  2  2  2
Avg obs per firm  10.558  11.04  9.672  10  10.421  12.074
Max obs per firm  24  24  24  24  24  24
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
∆MKTSHARE
Motor Property Legal Liability Pers. Acc. Misc. & Pecuniary Tot. Business
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Table VI 
Non-linearities in reinsurance ratio – market share growth interactions 
This table synthesizes the impact of reinsurance ratio on product market performance (ΔPMSHARE) at varying level of cession rates. The results pertain 
to cession rates at the total business level and the regressions employ our baseline SYS-GMM model described on page 12. For brevity only the 
estimates corresponding to reinsurance ratio – the explanatory variable of interest are reported. Columns 2 and 3 report the range (quartiles) of 
standardized reinsurance ratio used to group the data into respective sets. The values in parentheses report the corresponding non-standardized values 
of the reinsurance ratio. Last column reports coefficients obtained for zREINSt-1 in each of the data-subsets using the GMM-SYS estimator. The quantities 
in the square brackets are the corresponding robust standard errors. The variables used are winsorized at 1% level on both tails. The regressions used 
year-dummies to account for time specific effects. All variables are as defined in Table I. Superscripts *; ** and *** denote statistical significance at 
10%, 5% and 1% level respectively (one-tail).  
 
 
zREINSt-1 (REINSt-1) 
Coeff. Est. Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Very Low zREINS 
-1.38 -0.88 0.19 
(0.00) (0.07) [0.21] 
Low zREINS 
-0.88 -0.25 0.018 
(0.07) (0.25) [0.15] 
High zREINS 
-0.25 0.71 0.23** 
(0.25) (0.52) [0.12] 
Very High zREINS 
0.71 2.63 0.44** 
(0.52) (1.00) [0.25] 
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Figure 1. Premium growth response to reinsurance at varying levels of cession rates. 
This figure displays the estimated response of product-market share growth (ΔPMSHARE) to the lagged normalized reinsurance ratio (zREINS) at four 
different segments of the normalized leverage: [-1.38, -0.88); [-0.88, -0.25); [-0.25,0.71); [0.71,2.63). The slopes are the GMM-estimated coefficients 
using the baseline model as reported in Table VI. The estimated response is conditional on other variables being equal in each segment of observations.  
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